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Beyond a Sour Lemon: A Look at Grumet v.

Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village
School District*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Founding Fathers sought to guard against the publicly-aided institution of one or more religions. They guaranteed
religious freedom through the Constitution, mandating that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." 1 With this safeguard, called the Establishment
Clause, American citizens would be free from compulsion to
join a particular religion or to support a religious entity to
which they did not belong through paying taxes. The United
States Supreme Court has, in recent years, construed the Establishment Clause to preclude the noncoercive religious accommodation which both the Founding Fathers and prior
Courts have favored, 2 contorting the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom. By interpreting the Establishment
Clause in a narrow fashion, the judiciary has failed to accommodate the religious needs of our country's diverse citizenry.
The three-part test codified in the landmark case of Lemon v.
Kurtzman 3 has given rise to great difficulty in adjudicating
Establishment Clause cases, thus warping the First
Amendment's guarantee. 4
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals applied the Lemon5 test in Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel

* An earlier draft of this paper constituted the initial draft of an amicus
brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court in support of Petitioners, Board
of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District, et al. The brief was
submitted by the Institute for Religion and Polity, a non-profit, non-partisan
organization committed to the study of religious values and contemporary churchstate relations.
The author would like to thank Ronald D. Maines, a very skillful practitioner,
and Professors Frederick M. Gedicks and David A. Thomas for both their
inspiration and insight. The author takes full responsibility for the opinions (and
errors) herein.
1 U.S. CaNST. amend. I.
2 See discussion infra part IV.
3 403 u.s. 602 (1971).
4 See discussion infra part III.
5 See discussion infra part II.
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Village School District 6 • In so doing, it perpetuated the current
problems involved in Establishment jurisprudence. 7 In a word,
Lemon and Grumet do not square with the original rationales
for enacting the Establishment Clause.
In general, this Note analyzes Establishment jurisprudence
and the Supreme Court's shortcomings with respect to
noncoercive religious accommodation. It will explore the inadequacies of the Lemon test in adjudicating Establishment cases
and will suggest an alternative formulation based upon
noncoercion. More specifically, this Note examines the constitutionality of the Kiryas Joel Village School District, a secular
public school district which is presently entirely composed of
children of one religious background. Part II of this Note examines the reasoning in Grumet, and Part III shows why the New
York high court's reliance on the Lemon test is problematic.
Part IV affirms the coercion element as a valid test that fulfills
both current societal needs and originalist rationales for the
Establishment Clause. Finally, Part V explores the need for
religious accommodation without coercion, discussing Grumet
in light of the Establishment Clause's adjudicative history. This
Note concludes that the Court should take the opportunity this
term, when deciding Grumet, 8 to reexamine the Lemon test
and reformulate its Establishment jurisprudence by espousing
an accommodationist/noncoercion paradigm. If not, the Religion
Clauses, particularly the Establishment Clause, cannot provide
the constitutional guarantees the Founding Fathers intended.

II. THE SUPPOSED EFFECT OF AN ESTABLISHMENT IN
A.

GRUMET

The Facts

The Village of Kiryas Joel is a religious enclave. Located in
the town of Monroe, Orange County, New York, its inhabitants
are almost entirely members of the Satmarer Hasidim, a sect of
the Jewish faith. 9 The principal language of the village is Yiddish.10 The Satmarer, in addition to separation from an outside community, practice separation between sects and follow a

6
7
8
9
10

618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
See discussion infra part V.
618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 96-97.
ld. at 96.
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male and female dress code. 11 Radio, vision, and publications
in English are not widely used. 12
Most children in the Kiryas Joel Village receive their education in private religious schools. 13 Prior to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Aguilar v. Felton, 14 special education personnel from the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District taught the handicapped Satmarer Hasidic children in an
annex to one of the village's religious schools. 15 In 1985, the
Aguilar Court held that this arrangement was a violation of
the Establishment Clause. The Aguilar Court held Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 violated the
Establishment Clause because the Act authorized federallyfunded salaries for public employees who taught in parochial
schools. 16 The Court stated: "[ w]e have long recognized that
underlying the Establishment Clause is the 'objective . . . to
prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or
state] into the precincts of the other."'17 In response to
Aguilar, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District discontinued its teaching arrangement for the handicapped children
at the private school annex in Kiryas Joel. 18
"For some time thereafter, some of the handicapped
Satmarer Hasidic children attended special education classes
held at the Monroe-Woodbury public schools." 19 But litigation
ensued because the Satmarer Hasidim disagreed with the idea
of sending their handicapped children to school outside their
religious enclave. In Board of Education v. Wieder, 20 the New
York Court of Appeals noted that, "allegedly because of the
'panic, fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their
own community and being with people whose ways were so
different from theirs,' the parents stopped sending them to
programs offered at the public schools."21 The Wieder court
held that Education Law § 3602-c(2), 22 authorizing special

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

!d.
!d.
!d.
4 73 U.S. 402 (1985).
Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 96-97.
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413-14.
!d. at 413 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97.
!d.
527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (N.Y. 1988).
!d., noted in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97.
"Education Law § 3602-c(2) provides, in part: 'Boards of education of all
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education services to private school handicapped children, allowed boards of education to furnish those services in regular
public school classes or to provide otherwise. 23
As a result, the New York legislature enacted Chapter 748
of the Laws of 1989, creating the Kiryas Joel Village School
District, a new union free school district. 24 The district was
coterminous with the boundaries of the incorporated Satmarer
Hasidic village and was created within Monroe-Woodbury Central School District boundaries. 25 Chapter 748 also instituted
a school board whose five to nine members would serve a period not exceeding five years and would be elected by the voters
of Kiryas Joel. 26 Chapter 748 sought to resolve a longstanding
conflict between the Monroe-Woodbury School District and the
village of Kiryas Joel, whose population are all members of the
same religious sect. 27
Louis Grumet, Executive Director of the New York State
School Boards Association, and Albert Hawk, President of the
New York State School Boards Association, brought suit
against the New York State Education Department and several
state officials. Plaintiffs, both as citizen taxpayers and in their
state educational capacities, argued that Chapter 748 violated
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 28 Both the
Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School
District and the Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village
School District intervened as defendants. 29
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the
Supreme Court Appellate Division,30 holding that Chapter 748
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny as it violated the
Supreme Court's three-part test given in Lemon v. Kurtzman:

school districts of the state shall furnish services to pupils who are residents of
this state and who attend non-public schools located in such school districts, upon
the written request of the parent, guardian or persons legally having custody of
any such pupil.' Section 3602-c(l)(a) defines 'services' as 'instruction in the areas of
gifted pupils, occupational and vocational education and education for students with
handicapping conditions.'" Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97 n.3.
23 Wieder, 527 N.E.2d at 772, noted in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97.
24 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97.
25 !d.
26 !d.
27 [d. at 97 (citing Governor's Approval Mem., 1989 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN., at
324).
28 !d.
29 !d.
30 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592
N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
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"[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."'3t

B.

The New York Court of Appeals' Reasoning in Grumet

The New York Court of Appeals specifically addressed
Lemon's "effects" prong in its analysis. 32 The court also cited
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 33 affirming that government promotes religion:
when it fosters a close identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of any-or all-religious denominations
as when it attempts to inculcate specific religious doctrines. If
this identification conveys a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment Clause is violated.34

The court noted that, in considering whether a statute has the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, the consideration is "whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely
to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations
as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval,
of their individual religious choices."35 In sum, context will
determine whether a particular governmental action will likely
be perceived as a religious endorsement. 36 The state's high
court reasoned that "[g]overnmental action 'endorses' religion if
it favors, prefers, or promotes it."37
The New York Court of Appeals stated that "only Hasidic
children will attend the public schools in the newly established

31 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted), noted
in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 98. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
32 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 99.
33 473 u.s. 373, 389 (1985).
34 ld. at 389 (citations omitted).
35 ld. at 390. Despite this oft-quoted language, the Court has never adopted
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. See discussion infra part V.B.
36 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 595-97 (1989).
37 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 99. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593
(1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 691 (1984).
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school district, and only members of the Hasidic sect will likely
serve on the school board."38 As a result, the court concluded
that:
this symbolic union of church and State effected by the establishment of the Kiryas Joel Village School District under
Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by the Satmarer Hasidim as an endorsement of
their religious choices, or by nonadherents as a disapproval of
their individual religious choices. 39

The majority40 countered the dissent's argumene 1 that
Chapter 748 was analogous to the recent Supreme Court decision in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.42 In
Zobrest, a sign language interpreter was to be assigned to a
handicapped student attending a religious high school; the
Court held this to be a neutral benefit.43 The Grumet court
held that a school district coterminous with the boundaries of a
religious community could not be confused with the design of
"neutral" governmental benefits found in Zobrest. By creating
the school district in Kiryas Joel, the government is not offering "a neutral service ... as part of a general program that 'is
in no way skewed towards religion."'44
The court rejected the dissent's contention45 that Chapter
748, like the provision of services construed in Wolman v.
Walter, 46 gave rise to a "unit on a neutral site" serving "sectarian pupils."47 The Grumet court held that Chapter 748 did
not have the primary effect of providing services to handicapped children, because it yields:
to the demands of a religious community whose separatist
tenets create a tension between the needs of its handicapped
children and the need to adhere to certain religious practices.
Regardless of any beneficent purpose behind the legislation,
the primary effect of such an extensive effort to accommodate

38 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 100.
39 ld.
40 ld.
41 ld. at 116 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See discussion infra part V.C.
42 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
43 ld. at 2463.
44 ld. at 2467, noted in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 100-01.
45 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 116 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See discussion infra
part V.B.
46 433
229 (1977).
47 ld. at 247, noted in Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 101.

u.s.
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the desire to insulate the Satmarer Hasidic students inescapably conveys a message of governmental endorsement of religion.4s

The majority concluded that its decision did not "penalize
and encumber religious uniqueness" as the dissenting opinion
argued. 49 In closing, the court of appeals reiterated: "[s]pecial
services are made available to the Satmarer student within the
Monroe-Woodbury School District. Our decision does not impose any additional burdens on the students within Kiryas
Joel; it simply determines that the Legislature may not treat
the Satmarer community as separate, distinct and entitled to
special accommodation."50
III.

LEMON'S INFIRMITY

The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Grumet. 51 With this case, the Court should reexamine
the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 52 Despite three decades of use, the Court must reconsider the Lemon test because
of the disparate results it has engendered,53 the inconsistencies of its application, 54 and its unpopularity among a majority of current Justices. 5 5
The Establishment jurisprudential spectrum includes issues such as legislative prayer56 and tuition subsidies to parents of parochial school children. 57 The spectrum also includes
the more arduous church-state issues-graduation prayer, 58
prayer in schools, 59 and display of religious material in public

48 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 101.
49 ld. at 118 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See discussion infra part V.
50 ld. at 101.
51 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618
N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
52 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
53 See discussion infra part liLA.
54 See discussion infra part III.B.
55 See discussion infra part III.C.
56 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (declaring constitutional the historical use of prayer to open legislative sessions).
57 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (granting tax deductions to parents
of private- or public-school children for tuition).
58 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (holding unconstitutional clergyoffered prayers at high school graduation).
59 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama statute
authorizing voluntary prayer or meditation in schools). See also Abington Sch. Dist.
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fora. 60 If violative of the Constitution, creation of the Kiryas
Joel Village School District could be seen as one of the more
egregious Establishment Clause infractions in light of Lemon.
But, rather than adequately solving these issues, Lemon has
created several problems.

A.

Contradictory Outcomes Under Lemon

Numerous cases decided under the Lemon test have
reached disparate results, an incongruence which lacks a reasonable explanation. In cases involving public aid, the Court
has declared several forms of aid unconstitutional, but has also
upheld other forms of aid as constitutional and not violative of
the Establishment Clause. The Court has invalidated a reimbursement to nonpublic schools for textbooks, instructional
materials, and salaries, 61 but it has validated a reimbursement to non-public schools for costs associated with administering and maintaining state-mandated tests and records. 62 The
Court has struck down a statute providing for equipment and
instructional materials such as laboratory equipment and maps
to (and remedial instruction by public school employees in) nonpublic schools,63 while, on the other hand, it has upheld a provision of textbooks of secular subjects to non-public schools. 64
Similarly, the cases involving the creche, the menorah, and
other religious symbols in public fora have also been inconsistent.65

B.

The Inconsistency of Lemon's Application

Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the extensive use of
Lemon but argued that the Court has not strictly adhered to or
always used Lemon in Establishment analysis:
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (declaring unconstitutional a state law requiring
daily Bible reading in public school).
60 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See also Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating a Kentucky statute that required public schools to
display a copy of the Ten Commandments).
61 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 602-03 (1971).
62 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
63 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
64 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
65 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573 (1989) (disallowing a creche display on courthouse steps while permitting public display of a menorah next to a Christmas tree); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984) (allowing city to include the creche in the city's annual Christmas display).

531]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

539

[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.
In two cases, the Court did not even apply the Lemon "test."
We did not, for example, consider that analysis relevant in
Marsh v. Chambers. Nor did we find Lemon useful in Larson
v. Valente, where there was substantial evidence of overt
discrimination against a particular church. 66

The Court has also referred to Lemon's three prongs as "no
more than helpful signposts."67
Nevertheless, Justice White and the majority held in

Lamb's Chapel u. Center Moriches Union Free School District
that Lemon controls Establishment adjudication. 68 However,
the Court decided another Establishment Clause case only
eleven days after its decision in Lamb's Chapel, without even
mentioning the Lemon test. 69 The Court's inconsistent application of the Lemon test is indeed perplexing.
C.

Current Justices' Dislike of Lemon

Five of the currently sitting Justices of the Court have
voiced their dissatisfaction with Lemon, namely Justices
Scalia, 70 Thomas, 71 Kennedy, 72 O'Connor, 73 and Chief Justice Rehnquist. 74 Though he was recently replaced on the

66 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted). See Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971).
67 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
68 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 n.7 (1993).
69 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). See also
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (refraining to invoke the Lemon test when
considering clergy-offered prayers at high school graduation).
70 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment); Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("pessimistic
evaluation" of Lemon).
71 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment); Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., dissenting).
72 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("Substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order.").
73 See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (voicing
"doubts about the entanglement test").
74 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
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Court, Justice White has similarly expressed his discontent
with Lemon. 75
Justice Scalia has announced his disquiet for "the strange
Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering
shapes [Lemon's] intermittent use has produced."76 He argues
that the Court has used Lemon to further (or inhibit) certain
practices with which it agrees (or disagrees), holding that
"[w ]hen we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke
it," but that "when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we
ignore [Lemon] entirely."77
In sum, the rigidity of Lemon's doctrinal analysis and its
inconsistent application have created great difficulty for the
Court in its Establishment jurisprudence. In recent years, the
Court has failed to enhance religious accommodation despite
originalist notions given for the First Amendment's passage.
IV.

COERCION, THE "LOST ELEMENT," RECONSIDERED

The Grumet court's application of Lemon is problematic
because Lemon marks a departure from originalist rationales
for the Establishment Clause.

senting) (Lemon test is "a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of
the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled
results.").
75 See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); New York v. Cathedral
Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland
Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment) ("I
am no more reconciled now to Lemon I than I was when it was decided. The
threefold test of Lemon I imposes unnecessary ... [and] superfluous tests for establishing [a First Amendment violation]."); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
76 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct 2141,
2150 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia here points to the "long list of
constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon." Id. (noting ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment
Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5 (1987); Jesse
H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1980); Philip B. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the
Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1984); William P. Marshall, "We Know It
When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495
(1986) (paraphrasing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. CT. REV. 1).
77 Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150 (citations omitted).
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The Court's Unjustified Departure from the
Coercion Element

The Court's current Establishment jurisprudence has
evolved most significantly within the past thirty years. In the
landmark decision of Engel v. Vitale, 78 the Court initiated the
formulation of its contemporary paradigm, holding that "[t]he
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
non-observing individuals or not." 79 Engel's holding was without precedent.
Prior to Engel, the Court had consistently considered coercion a fundamental element of Establishment jurisprudence. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut 80the Court characterized the Establishment Clause as "forestal[ling] compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any fonn of worship."81 Similarly, the coercion element was a central factor in
scrutinizing public school release-time programs and Sunday
closing laws. 82 Despite these precedents, Michael McConnell
notes that Engel introduced the legal notion "that the establishment clause does not involve an element of coercion. The
proposition has been passed down, with an ever-lengthening
string of citations, to be applied in cases in which so-called
establishments can be found by courts even though nobody's
religious liberty has been infringed in any way."83 This departure from the coercion element clearly does not square with
earlier precedents interpreting the Establishment Clause.

78 370 u.s. 421 (1962).
79 !d. at 430, noted in Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of
Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 934 (1986). Others have agreed with

McConnell's interpretation of the originalist noncoercion argument. See, e.g., Robert
L. Cord, Founding Intentions and the Establishment Clause: Harmonizing Accommodation and Separation, 10 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'v 47 (1987); Rodney K. Smith,
Establishment Clause Analysis: A Liberty Maximizing Proposal, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PuB. PoL'y 463 (1990). Nonetheless, McConnell is not without his critics.
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, ''Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim
About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37 (1991).

u.s.

80
81
82
203
83

310

u.s.

296 (1940).

!d. at 303.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
(1948).

McConnell, supra note 79, at 936.
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B. The Coercion Element's Essential Nature in Establishment
Jurisprudence
Three decades ago, former Justice Brennan rightly delineated Establishment (and First Amendment) jurisprudence:
"the line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers."84 An examination of the Framer's intent reveals that the First Amendment sought to protect against governmental coercion in religious matters.
A primary drafter and supporter, James Madison clarified
the wording of the First Amendment in the debates in the First
Congress; he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that
"Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience."85 Arguing the proposed
amendment was not intended to inhibit religion, Madison stated that he ''believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a
religion to which they would compel others to conform."86
Madison, in his well-known Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, holds that "religion 'can be
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence,"' and that "'compulsive support' of religion is 'unnecessary and unwarrantable."'87 Thus, rather than only an element, "[compulsion] is the essence of an establishment."88
McConnell notes that the Founding Fathers formulated the
religion clauses with the idea of further safeguarding religious
practice from coercion while simultaneously allowing
noncoercive religious accommodations:
Exponents of strict separation are embarrassed by the many
breaches in the wall of separation countenanced by those who
adopted the first amendment: the appointment of congressional chaplains, the provision in the Northwest Ordinance for

84 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
85 1 Annals of Congress 730 (J. Gales ed. 1934) (Aug. 15, 1789).
86 ld. at 731.
87 McConnell, supra note 79, at 937-38 (citing JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL
AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS '11'11 1, 3 (circa June 29,
1785)).
88 ld. at 937.
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religious education, the resolutions calling upon the President
to proclaim days of prayer and thanksgiving, the Indian treaties under which Congress paid the salaries of priests and
clergy, and so on. These actions, so difficult to reconcile with
modern theories of the establishment clause, are much easier
to understand if one sees religious coercion as the fundamental evil against which the clause is directed. 89

Thus, history allows the accommodation-not establishment-of religion in the absence of compulsion. Justice
Brennan concludes: "nothing in the Establishment Clause forbids the application of legislation having purely secular ends in
such a way as to alleviate burdens upon the free exercise of an
individual's religious beliefs."90
In 1970, the Walz Court acknowledged the originalist rationale in a case decided three decades earlier: "In Everson [v.
Board of Education] the Court declined to construe the Religion
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate
constitutional objective as illuminated by history."91 Similarly,
Justice Scalia has reaffirmed originalist notions: "[t]he coercion
that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was
coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force
of law and threat of penalty."92 Indeed, the Establishment
Clause "was adopted to prohibit such an establishment of religion at the federallevel." 93
In applying the Establishment Clause to the states in
Everson v. Board of Education, 94 the Court similarly prohibited state establishments of religion. It is this latter practice, respondents contend, that New York has unjustifiably accomplished by enacting Chapter 748. 95 But since provision for the
Kiryas Joel Village School District is only a religious accommodation and lacks the element of coercion, respondents' argument appears non sequitur.

89 ld. at 939.
90 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 295 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
91 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970). See Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
92 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2683 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93 ld.
94 330 u.s. 1 (1947).
95 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618
N.E.2d 94, 96 (N.Y. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
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PROVISION FOR THE KIRYAS JOEL VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT IN HARMONY WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The New York Court of Appeals invalidated Chapter 748 in
light of Lemon; however, Grumet was not a unanimous decision. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bellacosa explicates several reasons why Lemon's application is, first, misapplied, 96
and, second, leads to a result at odds with originalist Establishment rationales. 97 In addition, Grumet does not reconcile
with other accommodationist cases. 98

A. The Secular Purpose of Chapter 748
Judge Bellacosa reiterated the pains with which the school
district has sought to abide by Lemon's secular purpose prong.
First, the school superintendent is not Hasidic. With twenty
years of experience in special education, the superintendent is
only concerned with giving handicapped children a secular
education. 99 Second, with a wholly secular curriculum, it is
invalid to argue that Chapter 748 has given rise to a religious
school district. The school district is a secular one, measured by
the curriculum taught and not by the characteristics of the
school district's students. Establishment Clause infringements
arise "from the nature of the institution, not from the nature of
the pupils." 100
Creation of the Kiryas Joel Village School District follows
previous similar creations:
No one disputes that the [New York] Legislature has the
fundamental power to create a union free school district
within the boundaries of a previously existing school district
to facilitate the provision of public education to a particular
group of students. Plaintiffs concede that approximately 20
such school districts have been created by acts of the Legislature.101

Plaintiffs challenge "what is otherwise an entirely secular act
of public education administration effected by the other two

96 See discussion infra part V.A-B.
97 See discussion infra part V.D.
98 See discussion infra part V.C.
99 See Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 111-12 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
100 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977). But see discussion supra
part II.B.
101 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 112 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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branches of State government, on their sectarian interpretation
of" Kiryas Joel Village's unique cultural characteristics. 102
Despite this, "no claim is made of any alleged restrictive covenants among the village's property owners, or of any alleged
irregularity in the conduct of municipal or school district elections, or of any exclusion of non-Hasidim in any respects of
governance, employment or availment of educational services."103 Thus, plaintiffs fail in their contentions that the school
district was created without precedent or that the school district is religious.
Plaintiffs assert that "because the municipality and school
district share identical borders and frame an enclave currently
populated only by Satmarer Hasidim, the very existence of the
public school district by authorization of the Legislature and
executive constitutes, on its face, an establishment of religion
prohibited by the United States Constitution." 104 Judge
Bellacosa concludes that "[t]he logical and inexorable extension
of this canon would dictate the extinguishment of the Village
itself for the identical infirmity." 105
If, according to plaintiffs' contention, the school district is
an establishment of religion, so, too, is the incorporation of the
village itself. Neither supposed Establishment "violation" is
more egregious than the other. Judge Bellacosa argues that
both are benign: just as incorporation of the village cannot be
considered an endorsement or establishment of religion, provision for a secular public school district-though coterminous
with the village boundaries-cannot be considered an unconstitutional establishment. 106
The secular purpose prong of Lemon is violated "only if the
enactment was 'motivated wholly by [a religious] purpose."'107
But because the stated purpose of Chapter 748 was to allow
"only handicapped pupils of the Village of Kiryas Joel to receive
a publicly supported, secular special education to which they
are entitled," the statute is not an infraction of Lemon's secular
purpose prong. 108 Were the school district to consolidate the

102
103
104
105
106
107

ld. at 112-13 (Bellacosa, J.,dissenting).
!d. at 113 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
!d.
ld.
!d.
ld. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (emphasis add-

ed)).
108 ld.
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public and private/religious schools in the village or to develop
a sectarian curriculum in the public schools, they would undeniably implicate the Establishment Clause.
The predicament of the Kiryas Joel Village School District
and its history is a "controversy of virtually epic proportions."109 Nevertheless, after the tumult subsides, only the
students will suffer if the Court determines that Chapter 748 is
indeed unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals' decision rests solely on Lemon's "effects" prong. 110 But the accusation that Chapter 748 is an endorsement of the Satmarer Hasidim is without justification.

B.

The "Effects" Prong's Inadequate Measure of a Religious
Establishment

The "effects" prong has been frequently analyzed with
respect to an "endorsement" of religion, though the Court's
"unsettled jurisprudence in the area of possible government
'endorsement' of religion leaves this subbranch of the Lemon
test somewhat suspect." 111 Justice O'Connor sought to give
shape to the issue of endorsement: an "objective observer"
would consider "the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute" to determine whether an imprimatur of
state approval of religion has occurred in the questioned action.112
Though members of the school board may mirror the religious and ethnic characteristics of the Kiryas Joel voters, such
an occurrence is not an Establishment violation. Similar to the
village of Kiryas Joel, other religious groups throughout this
country may predominate politically in their respective communities: Catholics in Rhode Island, Protestants in the "Bible
Belt" South, Mormons in Utah, or Jews in New York. These
groups and others similarly situated find themselves politically
influential though no one could legitimately contest their participation in the community and its political process.

109 ld. at 110.
110 ld. at 99.
111 ld. at 114 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (noting Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("the phrase 'endorsing religion,' ... cannot suffice as a rule of decision consistent with our precedents and our traditions in this part of our jurisprudence")).
112 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985).
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Plaintiffs would have difficulty arguing that this represents a government approval of those particular predominant
faiths or a disapproval of the minority faiths in those communities.113 In sum, though the residents of Kiryas Joel (or any
other one-faith-predominating community) will elect members
of their faith to public office, this does not amount to a governmental endorsement of that particular religious faith.
Judge Bellacosa argued that observers who objected to
Chapter 748 "perhaps suffered from a predisposed hostility to
religion in the constitutional debate sense. Truly objective observers should be able to conscientiously accept this legislation
as secular, neutral and benign within the reasonable doubt
spectrum." 114
Judge Bellacosa maintained that "no message of endorsement for Satmar theology or its particular separatist tenets
need necessarily or can fairly be inferred, either by objective
third parties or by the protagonists themselves" but that "the
people of the State of New York, as a whole, gain a compelling
benefit in the compromise solution achieved here." 115 Indeed,
"[t]he incidental, 'attenuated' benefit to the minority Satmar
viewpoint supports [New York's] rich pluralistic tradition and
does not diminish, but rather enhances, the common good." 116
Justice Scalia argues that "maintaining respect for the
religious observances of others is a fundamental civic virtue
that government (including the public schools) can and should
cultivate." 117 Such accommodation through respect does not
equal an establishment of religion. "[The Court's] precedents
plainly contemplate that on occasion some advancement of
religion will result from governmental action." 118
Justice Scalia has shown the problematic nature of the
"endorsement" test: "[w]hat a strange notion, that a Constitu-

113 Cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(where "endorsement" of one or more religions "sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac.
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.").
114 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618
N.E.2d 94, 115 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
115 ld.
116 ld.
117 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2682 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
majority in Weisman failed to agree with Justice Scalia's axiom. ld. at 2658.
118 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984).
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tion which itself gives 'religion in general' preferential treatment (I refer to the Free Exercise Clause) forbids endorsement
of religion in general." 119 Only by effectuating the purposes of
both religion clauses can the two be harmonious. Indeed,
those who adopted our Constitution . . . believed that the
public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good. It
suffices to point out that during the summer of 1789, when it
was in the process of drafting the First Amendment, Congress
enacted the famous Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1789,
Article III of which provides, "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged." 120

Just as tolerance of religious speech (in an open forum)
"does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious
sects or practices," 121 neither can Chapter 748 be construed
as an official state sanction of Satmarer Hasidic religious practices.

C.

Consistency in Accommodation

Justice Brennan stated that "even when the government is
not compelled to do so by the Free Exercise Clause, it may to
some extent act to facilitate the opportunities of individuals to
practice their religion." 122 The provision of secular education
for handicapped students in the Kiryas Joel Village School
District thus does not amount to an Establishment infraction.
The Court has accommodated the particular idiosyncratic
religious practices of other faiths. For example, fundamentalist
Christians have the right to deny a pregnant, married teacher
from teaching at their parochial school; their religion holds that
a woman should remain home to nurture her preschool children. 123 The Court has upheld the right of the Mormon

119 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2151 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
120 1 Stat. 52 (1789), quoted in Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2151 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
121 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981).
122 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263 (invalidating a university regulation that prohibited religious use of university buildings).
123 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619
(1986).
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Church to deny employment to someone who does not subscribe
to particular important Mormon beliefs. 124 The Court has acknowledged the right of Amish parents to keep their children
from attending public schools (beyond the eighth grade); the
Amish strive to avoid worldly ideals such as competition and
the pursuit of material wealth, mores their children may witness in public schools. 125 To remain neutral, the Court should
also accommodate Satmarer Hasidic religious practices.
The Court ruled in Zobrest that providing a sign language
interpreter for a deaf parochial student was not violative of the
Establishment Clause since such a service was "neutral" and,
at most, provided religion only an "attenuated" benefit. 126
Just as this sectarian-related aid was declared constitutional in
Zobrest, Chapter 748 also falls within Establishment parameters; it even steers clear of governmental aid in a parochial
setting. The measure does not fully accommodate the religious
tenets of the Satmarer; quite the contrary, though it may provide for the "separationist" element, it represents a compromise
of Satmar beliefs:
the new public school district offers programs and services at
odds with many basic precepts of Satmarer Hasidism. Secularism itself is antithetical to Hasidism, yet secularism is the
quid pro quo imposed by the State for these Village residents
to avail themselves in this way of State-regulated special educational services for their handicapped youngsters....
[While] English is the language of instruction within the
school[,] Yiddish is the medium of communication within the
village. In contrast to the method of instruction at the sectarian schools in the Village, male and female students at the
public special education school are grouped together for teaching purposes at the special school; instructional materials are
not based upon the sex of the student being taught; female
employees are not prohibited from exercising authority over
male employees; the physical appearance of the building is
secular, including the significant absence of mezuzahs on the
doorposts; and the dress of the employees is secular in appearance. 127
124 Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). For an exposition of religious group rights in
light of Amos and Dayton Christian Schools, see Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99.
125 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
126 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2463-67 (1993).
See discussion supra part II.B.
127 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618
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With these compromises, the Satmarer Hasidim have shown
their willingness to abide by the law. Governor Cuomo emphasized that "this new school district must take pains to avoid
conduct that violates the separation of church and state" but
that he believed "they will be true to their commitment." 128
By ensuring the secular nature of the school for its handicapped children, it is true that the "democratically elected
Board of Trustees of the Kiryas Joel Village School District has
strained to create a nonsectarian educational environment
which is faithful to the secular command of the statute." 129
Judge Bellacosa reaffirms that "this effort is indicative of the
secular compromise the Hasidim community was willing to absorb to allow the special education needs of their children to be
met within a public, neutral, nondenominational setting." 130
Yet the "establishment of a union free school district geographically identical to an incorporated municipality ... should
not be stigmatized as aid to a particular denomination, simply
because the inhabitants of that municipality are predominantly
or even exclusively members of that denomination." 131 To rule
this an Establishment violation would abrogate the Free Exercise Clause; Judge Bellacosa affirms that invalidating the legislation at issue "deprives the citizens of Kiryas Joel of certain
educational prerogatives in contravention of their fundamental
right to self-governance. Their free exercise of religion is also
inextricably implicated and compromised, simply because they
have chosen to live and believe in a particular way together in
an incorporated village." 132
Because the "government must be neutral when it comes to
competition between sects," 133 denial of an accommodation
here, contrasted with accommodation of the Amish, Mormons,
fundamentalist Christians, and other religious groups, amounts
to a non-neutral jurisprudence. Such a practice is itself unconstitutional.

N.E.2d 94, 115-17 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
544 (1993).
128 Governor's Approval Mem., 1989 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN., at 325, noted in
Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 117 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
129 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 117 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
130 ld.
131 !d. at 117-18 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
132 !d. at 118 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
133 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
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The Lack of Coercion in Chapter 748

While Chapter 748 neither coerces nor influences religious
belief, it does facilitate the exercise of the Satmarer Hasidic
faith; this accommodation cannot be seen as an establishment
of religion. McConnell reiterates the need to reexamine Lemon:
Doctrinally, renewed attention to coercion suggests that the
Court's three-part test for an establishment of religion should
be modified. A rule that forbids government actions with the
purpose or effect of advancing religion fails to distinguish
between efforts to coerce and influence religious belief and
action, on the one hand, and efforts to facilitate the exercise
of one's chosen faith, on the other. 134

Under an accommodationist paradigm that applies a
noncoercion analysis, government in its ideological neutrality
will neither advance nor inhibit religion, a result Lemon has
failed to achieve. 135
VI.

CONCLUSION

The three-prong Lemon test must be reconsidered in light
of several factors: the contradictory outcomes it engenders, 136
the inconsistency of its application, 137 most of the current
Justices' dislike of Lemon/ 38 and its departure from a
noncoercion paradigm. 139
Coercion was the element against which the Founding
Fathers safeguarded America; they viewed the religion clauses
as a means of enhancing the free exercise of religious beliefs
while protecting against an unconstitutional coercive establishment of religion. The Court's departure from coercion analysis
was without justification. In the absence of compulsion, government accommodation of religious beliefs is paramount to a
flourishing people. The Lemon test is thus inadequate as it
does not adequately measure a coercive element.
Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 is not violative of the
Establishment Clause; the Kiryas Joel Village School District,

134 McConnell, supra note 79, at 940. But see Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct.
2649, 2658 (1992) (holding even "subtle and indirect" coercion unconstitutional).
135 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
136 See discussion supra part III.A.
137 See discussion supra part III.B.
138 See discussion supra part III.C.
139 See discussion supra part IV.A-B.
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though an accommodation, cannot be considered an establishment of the Satmarer Hasidic religion. To disallow the creation
of a school district that provides a secular education to Kiryas
Joel's handicapped students would implicate the Free Exercise
Clause. Lemon's "effects" prong insufficiently appraises establishments of religion. A failure by the Court to find in favor of
the school district would further compound an already inconsistent Establishment jurisprudence. Because Chapter 748 does
not involve an element of coercion, provision for the school
district is constitutional. Indeed, a reformulation of Establishment jurisprudence that includes the coercion element in its
paradigm satisfies both originalist notions and society's current
needs.
The Court's previous recognition of the need for neutrality,
noncoercion, and accommodation warrants reconsideration. In
conclusion, "[ w]hen the state . . . cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." 140 The Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions .... Anything less would require the
'callous indifference' we have said was never intended by the
Establishment Clause." 141
Judge Bellacosa leaves a reminder for the Court to consider in its adjudication of Grumet: "A culturally diverse Nation,
which proclaims itself under a banner, E Pluribus Unum, ...
[cannot] penalize and encumber religious uniqueness" unless it
"strikes the 'E Pluribus' and leaves only the 'Unum.' "142
Scott S. Thomas

140 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
141 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (citations omitted).
142 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618
N.E.2d 94, 118 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544
(1993).

